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I. INTRODUCTION
And if your brother sins, go and show him his fault in private; if he
listens to you, you have won your brother.
But if he does not listen to you, take one or two more with you, so
that by the mouth of two or three witnesses every fact be confirmed.
* B.A., University of Texas at Austin; J.D., American University Washington College
of Law.
THE SCHOLAR
If he refuses to listen to them, tell it to the church; and if he refuses
to listen even to the church, let him be to you as a Gentile and a tax
collector.'
In the late 1850's, the divisive character of the Civil War spilled into
Kentucky's Walnut Street Presbyterian Church, where divided factions of
the congregation began a two decade battle for control over the church's
religious identity and physical property.2 In Watson v. Jones,3 the United
States Supreme Court refused to decide the religious merits of the con-
troversy, using a doctrine of ecclesiastical abstention to defer the decision
to the Presbyterian Church "judicatory."4
In July of 2000, C.L. "Buddy" Westbrook, pastor at the CrossLand
Community Bible Church, engaged in a series of marital counseling "jam
sessions" with a parishioner named Peggy Penley and her husband.5 The
"jam sessions" failed to rehabilitate Penley's marriage, and Penley soon
informed Westbrook of her intent to divorce her husband.6 Immediately
afterward, Westbrook executed his church's biblical disciplinary pro-
cess-including the command of Matthew 18:15-17 7-by informing the
church membership of Penley's intent to divorce, and instructing the
church to shun Penley.s One hundred and twenty-nine years after the
Watson decision, ecclesiastical abstention will govern part of Westbrook v.
Penley, a case before The Supreme Court of Texas that presents several
challenging questions of First Amendment jurisprudence.9
1. Matthew 18:15-17 (New American Standard) (emphasis omitted).
2. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 681 (1871); see Patty Gerstenblith, Civil
Court Resolution of Property Disputes Among Religious Organizations, 39 AM. U. L. REV.
513, 521-22 (1990) (detailing the factual background of the Watson case). The dispute in
Watson split the Walnut Street Presbyterian Church into two factions: pro-slavery and anti-
slavery. Id. at 521.
3. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871). See infra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
4. Id. at 733-35 (ruling that a decision could not be made because the Court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction and discussing the inappropriateness of a civil court to decide
matters concerning ecclesiastical questions).
5. Penley v. Westbrook, 146 S.W.3d 220, 224 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, pet.
granted) (op.) (highlighting that Westbrook allegedly "held himself out" as a qualified
marriage and family counselor).
6. Id. at 224.
7. Matthew, supra note 1 ("And if he refuses to listen to them, tell it to the church, let
him be to you as a Gentile and a tax collector.").
8. Penley, 146 S.W.3d at 225 (noting Westbrook's "tough love" attempt to persuade
Penley to regain her senses and return to her marriage).
9. Westbrook v. Penley, No. 04-0838 (Tex. Sept. 26, 2006); Petition for Review at iv,
Westbrook v. Penley, No. 04-0838 (Tex. Nov. 26, 2004); see, e.g., Advice and Consent at the
Church, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 9, 2006, at Cross Country, available at http://
www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/061001/9cross.htm (debating Westbrook's role as a
minister and professional counselor); Eileen E. Flynn, Lawsuit Issue: Is He Pastor or Ther-
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This note begins by describing the factual background of Westbrook,
focusing on Pastor Westbrook's dual role as religious leader and licensed
professional counselor.' ° The note follows the development of the First
Amendment doctrine of ecclesiastical abstention from its origins in Wat-
son, through its most recent development in Jones v. Wolf." Next, this
note argues that The Supreme Court of Texas should not abstain from
deciding the merits of Westbrook because of Westbrook's unique role as
religious leader and licensed professional counselor.' 2 This note also ar-
gues that recent political developments-particularly the emergence of
the White House Office of Faith-based and Community Initiatives-am-
plify the need for clear lines in the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine.' 3
Finally, this note suggests that, despite meager treatment by the West-
brook parties and The Supreme Court of Texas, Westbrook deserves criti-
cal evaluation under the framework of Employment Division Department
of Human Resources v. Smith.14
II. THE WESTBROOK V. PENLEY BACKGROUND
A. "Buddy" Westbrook and the CrossLand Community Bible Church
Pastor C.L. "Buddy" Westbrook is the senior pastor of CrossLand
Community Bible Church (CCBC), a "Christ centered church" in Fort
Worth, Texas.' 5 Along with three other church members, Westbrook ad-
ministered the membership and disciplinary policies set out in CCBC's
statement of faith and constitution.' 6 The CCBC Constitution includes
explicit disciplinary policies:
We believe that one of the primary responsibilities of the church is to
maintain the purity of the Body. We are directed by God to be holy.
In recognition of this obligation, the elders will biblically and lov-
ingly utilize every appropriate means to restore members who find
themselves in patterns of serious misconduct. When efforts at resto-
ration fail, the elders will apply the Biblical teaching on church disci-
apist?, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Sept. 27, 2006, at A01 (emphasizing the particular gravity
of the Westbrook decision for churches).
10. See infra Part II.
11. 443 U.S. 595 (1979) (approving a state's neutral principles approach to church
property disputes).
12. See infra Part III B.
13. See infra Part III C.
14. 496 U.S. 913 (1990) (upholding an Oregon law that prohibited the use of peyote as
consistent with the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause); see infra Part IV.
15. Penley, 146 S.W.3d at 223. See generally CrossLand Community Bible Church,
Welcome to Crossland Community Bible Church, http://crosslandchurch.com (last visited
Feb. 15, 2007).
16. Penley, 146 S.W.3d at 223.
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pline, which could include revocation of membership, along with an
appropriate announcement made to the membership (Matt 18:15-17; I
Cor 5:1-5; Gal 6:1, 2; 2 Thes 3:6).
When a member engages in a pattern of conduct which visibly vio-
lates Biblical standards, or which is detrimental to the ministry,
unity, peace, or purity of the church, and such a member remains
unrepentant, the elders will follow our Lord's instructions from Mat-
thew 18:15-20. If the member remains unrepentant and chooses not to
resign, such member will be removed from membership. This action
will be announced to the congregation in a tenderhearted, discreet
manner, followed by prayer, at the first appropriate Sunday service
thereafter. The goal of such discipline will be to encourage repen-
tance and restoration of fellowship with the Lord and His people. 7
While serving as CCBC's pastor, Westbrook also worked as a licensed
professional counselor, specializing in marital counseling.' 8 Texas im-
poses a licensing scheme and various statutory requirements on licensed
professional counselors, including specific duties of confidentiality be-
tween counselor and counselee.' 9
B. Peggy Penley as Parishioner and Counselee
In becoming a member of CCBC in 1999, Peggy Penley affirmed her
"willingness to abide by the constitution of th[e] church" by writing
"[s]ure, I can abide by the church constitution . . . willingly."2 After
Penley encountered marital difficulties, she and her husband separated,
and the two began a series of counseling sessions with Westbrook.21 As
part of the counseling, Westbrook hosted weekly counseling "jam ses-
sions," where Westbrook, Penley and her husband, and other couples
from CCBC discussed how to avoid divorce and improve their mar-
riages.22 After several months without success, Penley told Westbrook of
her intent to divorce her husband.23
17. Id. at 223-24 (emphasis added).
18. Id. at 223. Westbrook received his professional counseling license before serving
as the pastor at CCBC. Id.
19. See TEX. Occ. CODE § 503 (Vernon 2006) (establishing the regulatory scheme for
licensed professional counselors); 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE AN. § 681.41 (Vernon 2006)
(outlining the Texas State Board of Examiner of Professional Counselor's Code of Ethics).
20. Penley, 146 S.W.3d at 224 (ellipses in original).
21. Id.
22. Brief for Petitioner on the Merits at 3, Westbrook v. Penley, No. 04-0838 (Tex.
June 18, 2005).
23. Penley, 146 S.W.3d at 224 (discussing the Westbrook's recommendation).
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Westbrook's reaction to the news of Penley's intent to divorce forms
the crux of the Westbrook dispute. In November of 2000, Westbrook dis-
closed Penley's intent to divorce to the other CCBC elders.2 4 In addition,
Westbrook published a letter to the entire CCBC membership which "in-
formed the congregation that Penley intended to divorce her husband,
that there was no biblical basis for the divorce, and that she had engaged
in a 'biblically inappropriate' relationship with another man., 25 After cit-
ing the church's disciplinary procedures, the letter "encouraged the
church body 'to shun' Penley for the purpose of obtaining her repentance
and restoration to the church."21 6 Penley divorced her husband in March
of 2001.27
C. Penley's Lawsuit
One year after the church letter, Penley sued CCBC, Westbrook, and
the three other church elders, seeking actual and exemplary damages.2 8
Penley alleged numerous causes of action, including defamation, breach
of fiduciary duty, intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of
privacy, and professional negligence.2 9 At trial, Westbrook and the other
defendants convinced the court that, as a result of the ecclesiastical ab-
stention doctrine, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over all of
Penley's claims.3 °
On appeal to the intermediate appellate court, Penley challenged only
one ruling-the dismissal of her action for professional negligence against
Westbrook.3 1 The appeals court conducted a careful search of Penley's
pleadings for allegations of a secular act that might trigger liability. 32 Af-
ter finding a sufficient reference to secular acts of counseling, the court
agreed with Penley that the trial court's jurisdiction was not barred by
ecclesiastical abstention.3 3 Westbrook appealed.3 4
24. Id. at 224-25.
25. Id. (quoting the elders' letter).
26. Id. at 225.
27. Id.
28. Penley, 146 S.W.3d at 225.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 226 (dismissing all of Penley's claims against Westbrook and the three
church elders).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 231-33.
33. Penley, 146 S.W.3d at 231-33.
34. Petition for Review, Westbrook v. Penley, No. 04-0838 (Tex. Nov. 26, 2004).
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III. THE ECCLESIASTICAL ABSTENTION DOCTRINE
A. The Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine in the United States Supreme
Court
The Supreme Court of the United States first outlined the ecclesiastical
abstention doctrine in Watson v. Jones, where a divided church congrega-
tion disputed the right to exclusive use of certain church property.35 The
Court asserted that, "whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or
ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest of...
church judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal tribu-
nals must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on them, in their
application to the case before them."36 According to the Court:
The right to organize voluntary religious associations ... and to cre-
ate tribunals for the decision of controverted questions of faith
within the association ... is unquestioned. All who unite themselves
to such a body do so with an implied consent to this government, and
are bound to submit to it. But it would be a vain consent and would
lead to the total subversion of such religious bodies, if any one ag-
grieved by one of their decisions could appeal to the secular courts
and have them reversed. It is of the essence of these religious un-
ions, and of their right to establish tribunals for the decision of ques-
tions arising among themselves, that those decisions should be
binding in all cases of ecclesiastical cognizance, subject only to such
appeals as the organism itself provides for.37
35. Watson, 80 U.S. 679. Church property disputes are the most common subject of
ecclesiastical abstention cases in the United States Supreme Court and have produced in-
teresting jurisprudence specific to property disputes. See Elizabeth Ehrlich, Note, Taking
the Religion Out of Religious Property Disputes, 46 B.C. L. REV. 1069 (2005) (describing
various approaches to church property disputes); Gerstenblith, supra note 2, at 681. How-
ever, instead of the specific rules governing property disputes, this note focuses on the
broader rules for ecclesiastical abstention.
36. Watson, 80 U.S. at 727. Watson also addressed, in dicta, rules for interpreting writ-
ten grants of property that use religious terms, as well as the distribution of property held
by independent congregations. Id. at 722-26. Although Watson was decided as a matter of
federal common law before the incorporation of the First Amendment, the Court would
later import the Watson opinion into its First Amendment jurisprudence. Kedroff v. St.
Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 115-16 (1952); Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary
Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 445-48 (1969).
37. Watson, 80 U.S. at 728-29 (emphasis added). But see Serbian E. Orthodox Dio-
cese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709 (1976) (arguing that the First Amendment com-
mands abstention only "where resolution of the disputes cannot be made without extensive
inquiry by civil courts into religious law and polity"); Md. and Va. Eldership of the
Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, 396 U.S. 367, 369-70 (1970) (Brennan,
J., concurring) (arguing that Watson's deference to a church's governing body is only ap-
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In addition to the subject immediately at issue in Watson-church deci-
sions concerning the true identity of congregations-Watson's dicta ex-
tended the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine to decisions concerning
church membership and excommunication.38 According to Watson,
courts "cannot decide who ought to be members of the church, nor
whether the excommunicated have been justly or unjustly, regularly or
irregularly cut off from the body of the church."39 Watson also attempted
to broadly demarcate the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. The Court
reasoned that they should abstain where the subject of the action "con-
cerns theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical govern-
ment, or the conformity of the members of the church to the standard of
morals required of them," but should not abstain where the subject of the
action "in no sense depend[s] on ecclesiastical questions."4 ° Thus, Wat-
son stands for abstention and deference to religious decision making bod-
ies in cases that would require the court to decide a religious controversy.
Some later cases argued for more limited deference to ecclesiastical
tribunals. The Court in Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Ma-
nilaaa framed the doctrine such that, "[in the absence of fraud, collusion,
or arbitrariness, the decisions of the proper church tribunals on matters
purely ecclesiastical, although affecting civil rights, are accepted in litiga-
tion before the secular courts as conclusive .... "42 However, the fraud,
collusion, and arbitrariness standards were never developed, and cases
after Gonzalez returned to the more categorical approach.43 While
propriate where the "appropriate church governing body can be determined without the
resolution of doctrinal questions and without extensive inquiry into religious policy").
38. Watson, 80 U.S. at 730.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 732-33 (emphasis added). The same logic that bars inquiry into religious
subject matter also bars inquiry into the religious tribunal's jurisdiction, the form of pro-
ceeding, and other matters underlying the church's judgment. Id. at 733-34.
[I]t is easy to see that if the civil courts are to inquire into all these matters, the whole
subject of the doctrinal theology, the usages and customs, the written laws, and funda-
mental organization of every religious denomination may, and must, be examined into
with minuteness and care, for they would become, in almost every case, the criteria by
which the validity of the ecclesiastical decree would be determined in the civil court.
This principle would deprive these bodies of the right of construing their own church
laws, would open the way to all the evils which we have depicted as attendant upon
the doctrine of Lord Eldon, and would, in effect, transfer to the civil courts where
property rights were concerned the decision of all ecclesiastical questions. Id.
41. 280 U.S. 1 (1929).
42. Id. at 16 (emphasis added).
43. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 712 (1976) (observing
that "the suggested 'fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness' exception to the Watson rule was
dictum only"). The Serbian Court went on to explicitly reject the proposed exception for
arbitrariness, arguing that the exception was inconsistent "with the constitutional mandate
2007]
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"[c]ivil courts do not inhibit free exercise of religion merely by opening
their doors to disputes involving church property .... First Amendment
values are plainly jeopardized when church property litigation is made to
turn on the resolution by civil courts of controversies over religious doc-
trine and practice., 44
The Court's most recent treatment of ecclesiastical abstention came in
Jones v. Wolf,45 where the Court agreed with Watson and its progeny that
"the First Amendment prohibits civil courts from resolving church prop-
erty disputes on the basis of religious doctrine and practice., 46 However,
the Court held that the "First Amendment does not dictate that a state
must follow a particular method of resolving church property disputes." 47
"[A] [s]tate may adopt any one of various approaches for settling church
property disputes so long as it involves no consideration of doctrinal mat-
ters, whether the ritual and liturgy of worship or the tenets of faith.
48
Thus, the application of ecclesiastical abstention remains a nuanced
process. Under Georgia's "neutral-principles" approach, approved in
Jones, courts must "take special care to scrutinize" matters in dispute and
sever only secular matters for judicial evaluation.49 If a court applying
the neutral-principles approach encounters "a religious controversy, then
the court must defer to the resolution of the doctrinal issue by the author-
itative ecclesiastical body."5" Ultimately, the doctrine as asserted in Jones
focuses on whether the court would be forced to decide an inherently
religious question."
that civil courts are bound to accept the decisions of the highest judicatories of a religious
organization of hierarchical polity on matters of discipline, faith, internal organization, or
ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law." Id. at 713. Some commentators have also favored
modeling the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine after the Court's political question concept
of nonjusticiability. See Scott C. Idleman, Tort Liability, Religious Entities, and the Decline
of Constitutional Protection, 75 IND. L.J. 219, 220 & n.2 (2000).
44. Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969).
45. 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
46. Jones, 443 U.S. at 602 (citing Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426
U.S. 696 (1976); Md. and Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God at
Sharpsburg, 396 U.S. 367 (1970); Presbyterian Church in the U.S., 393 U.S. at 449-50.
47. Jones, 443 U.S. at 602 (emphasis added) (rejecting "a rule of compulsory defer-
ence to religious authority in resolving church property disputes").
48. Id. (citing Md. and Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God at
Sharpsburg, 396 U.S. 367, 369 (1969) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
49. Id. at 604.
50. Id.
51. See Little v. First Baptist Church, 475 U.S. 1148, 1149 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
A court may apply neutral principles of secular law to the dispute at hand. When that
process requires a court to determine the validity of a church decision, the court ordi-
narily must discern from the relevant canonical law what body is authorized to make a
[Vol. 9:409
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B. Ecclesiastical Abstention in Westbrook v. Penley
Westbrook v. Penley52 presents a novel and challenging application of
the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. While Penley initially asserted a
number of causes of action at trial, only one cause of action reached the
Supreme Court of Texas-a claim for professional negligence based on
the statutory duties of licensed professional counselors.53 Standards of
negligence for licensed professional counselors in Texas include a number
of statutory obligations.54 Before engaging in any form of "counseling,"55
licensees must provide written notice of, among other things, the "coun-
seling purposes, goals, and techniques," as well as "the limits on confiden-
tiality."'5 6 In addition, "[a] licensee shall set and maintain professional
boundaries. Dual relationships with clients are prohibited."57 Texas also
requires licensed professional counselors to abide by a strict code of
confidentiality.58
Penley alleges that Westbrook acted negligently by disclosing confiden-
tial facts concerning her marital relationship to the CCBC elders, and
ultimately to the CCBC congregation. 59 Yet Penley and Westbrook's ar-
guments to the court are troubling. Penley's argument assumes that ab-
stention can be avoided only if the counseling sessions and disclosure of
information are characterized, at least in part, as secular acts.60 Similarly,
Westbrook argues that ecclesiastical abstention is appropriate whenever
particular decision within the church, and what decision that body has reached. Hav-
ing done so, the court may not inquire whether the decision was made arbitrarily or
whether it conflicts with the ecclesiastical precepts of the organization. Id.
52. Petition for Review, Westbrook v. Penley, No. 04-0838 (Tex. Nov. 29, 2006).
53. Penley, 146 S.W.3d at 227.
54. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 14 (Pro-
posed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) ("An actor is negligent if, without excuse, the actor violates
a statute that is designed to protect against the type of accident the actor's conduct causes,
and if the accident victim is within the class of persons the statute is designed to protect.");
53 TEX. JUR. 3D Negligence § 11 (2006).
55. "'Counseling' means assisting a client through a therapeutic relationship, using a
combination of mental health and human development principles, methods, and tech-
niques, including the use of psychotherapy, to achieve the mental, emotional, physical,
social, moral, educational, spiritual, or career-related development and adjustment of the
client throughout the client's life." TEX. OCC. CODE § 503.003(b)(3) (Vernon 2006).
56. 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 681.41(e) (Vernon 2006).
57. 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 681.41(k) (Vernon 2006) ("A dual relationship is consid-
ered any non-counseling activity initiated by either the licensee or client for the purpose of
establishing a non-therapeutic relationship.").
58. 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 681.41(x) (Vernon 2006); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 611.001-611.008 (Vernon 2006).
59. Penley, 146 S.W.3d at 225, 231.
60. Brief for Respondent on the Merits at 7-8, 13-17, Westbrook v. Penley, No. 04-
0838 (Tex. July 11, 2005).
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the conduct can be characterized as "religious," and that abstention can
be avoided only in cases of "purely secular conduct."'" Both parties mis-
construe the relevant inquiry.
Ultimately, Penley's claim for professional negligence does not trigger
the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. Both Penley and Westbrook err by
emphasizing the secular/religious dichotomy of Westbrook's underlying
conduct, instead of emphasizing the nature of a professional negligence
claim. The precedents are clear-while the Supreme Court of the United
States has abstained from decisions that would have required the Court
to answer a question of religion,6" the Court did not abstain from disputes
that, while touching on religious conduct, did not require answers to relig-
ious questions.63 Penley's claim undoubtedly touches CCBC's pastor, the
CCBC elders, and the CCBC disciplinary process. Matters of religious
doctrine and practice are certainly related to this action; for example,
whether Westbrook complied with (or departed from) CCBC's discipli-
nary doctrines and Biblical commands. Yet the claim of professional neg-
ligence does not require the court to address those issues. That is, the
litigation does not trigger abstention because the claim for professional
negligence does not turn on a question of religious doctrine or procedure.
Instead, the Westbrook court can and should resolve all issues of West-
brook's professional liability by utilizing the explicit and neutral princi-
ples contained in the Texas statutes and regulations.64 While this
61. Brief for Respondent on the Merits at 6-8, 25-29, Westbrook v. Penley, No. 04-
0838 (Tex. June 20, 2005).
62. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 718, 720-21 (abstaining from decid-
ing whether "the proceedings resulting in Bishop Dionisije's removal and defrockment
were not in accordance with the prescribed procedure of the constitution and the penal
code of the Serbian Orthodox Church" and whether "the Mother Church's reorganization
of the American-Canadian Diocese into three Dioceses was invalid because it was in clear
and palpable excess of its own jurisdiction" (internal quotations omitted)); Presbyterian
Church in the U.S., 393 U.S. at 450 (abstaining from deciding whether "actions of the gen-
eral church constitute such a 'substantial departure' from the tenets of faith and practice");
Kreshik v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190 (1960) (abstaining from deciding which
group within the hierarchical church was entitled to use church property); Gonzalez v.
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929) (abstaining from deciding
"what the essential qualifications of a chaplain are and whether the candidate possesses
them").
63. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text (discussing Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S.
595 (1979), where the Court did not abstain from deciding which faction of a congregation
was entitled to control a property); see also infra Part IV (discussing Employment Div. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)).
64. See Watson, 80 U.S. at 727 (instructing deference only to church adjudications
concerning "questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law").
"When a civil right depends upon an ecclesiastical matter, it is the civil court and not the
ecclesiastical which is to decide." Id. at 731 (quoting Harmon v. Dreher, 1 S.C. Eq. (Speers
Eq.) 87, 120 (1843)); accord Michael William Galligan, Note, Judicial Resolution of In-
[Vol. 9:409
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conclusion eliminates Westbrook's argument for barring the action en-
tirely, it does not prevent him from asserting more typical defenses to tort
liability, including a potential First Amendment defense on other
grounds.
C. Ecclesiastical Abstention in the Age of Faith-Based Initiatives
In many cases, the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine acts to disable suits
at the point where courts seek to establish the duty or standard of care of
a reasonable religious person." Without a set of purely secular standards
of conduct, these courts are unable to establish negligence.66 In contrast,
the result I argue for in Westbrook is largely driven by the state's imposi-
tion of the professional counselor licensing scheme-an explicit standard
of care for tort law's reasonable person. Unlike most religious actors,
Westbrook's legal obligations are distinguishable because of his choice to
participate in an activity subject to explicit legislative regulation. 67 This
unique aspect of Westbrook helps illustrate the growing significance of
the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine in light of recent national policies.
The White House Office of Faith-based and Community Initiatives and
its associated programs and policies68 (faith-based programs) have cre-
ated the potential for an explosion in ecclesiastical abstention litigation.
In general terms, before the creation of faith-based programs, religious
recipients of public funds were required to "secularize" their services and
the premises on which they were offered.69 That and other factors con-
tributed to a low level of religious participation in the public grant pro-
trachurch Disputes, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 2007, 2029 (1983) (advocating the use of neutral
principles along with "functional, administrative investigations of internal church
practice").
65. See, e.g., Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church, 134 F.3d 331, 337 (5th Cir. 1998).
Defining [the standard of care] could embroil courts in establishing the training, skill,
and standards applicable for members of the clergy in a diversity of religions with
widely varying beliefs. Furthermore, defining such a standard would require courts to
identify the beliefs and practices of the relevant religion and then to determine
whether the clergyman had acted in accordance with them. Id.
66. Id. (explaining that state courts have "rejected uniformly" malpractice claims
against clergy).
67. See supra notes 19, 54-58, and accompanying text (outlining the statutory regula-
tions governing professional counselors).
68. See generally Kathryn Dunn Tenpas, Associate Director, Univ. of Pa. Wash. Se-
mester Program, Remarks at the Pew Forum, "Can an Office Change a Country? The
White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, a Year in Review" discus-
sion (Feb. 20, 2002), available at http://pewforum.org/events/index.PHPEvent I=23.
69. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-616, FAITH-BASED AND COM-
MUNITY INITIATIVE: IMPROVEMENTS IN MONITORING GRANTEES AND MEASURING PER-
FORMANCE COULD ENHANCE ACCOUNTABILITY 1 (2006).
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grams.7" Under the new grant regime, religious organizations are eligible
to compete for funds on the same basis as secular organizations, and may
use federal funds for all but "inherently religious" activities. 7 ' This new
set of faith-based programs will have a number of intriguing effects on
ecclesiastical abstention litigation.
First, the faith-based programs will, if successful, increase the interac-
tions between churches and the public.72 Like any potential tortfeasor,
increasing net interactions will increase the opportunities for tortious acts
by clergy members.73 Second, the participation of religious actors in
faith-based programs will subject the churches to significant regulation in
their conduct as governmental grant executors. 4 The scope of regulatory
frameworks for grant recipients is broad, "moving from the noncontro-
versial health and safety standards; progressing on to nondiscrimination
requirements . . . and, most meddlesome, to various degrees of control
over the curriculum or program content.",75 As in Westbrook, this move-
ment of religious actors into secular regulatory schemes is likely to ex-
pose religious groups to more tort litigation without the protection of
ecclesiastical abstention. I argue not that the faith-based programs are
more likely to produce tortfeasors, per se, but that the faith-based pro-
grams will cause members of the clergy to lead more dual lives-some-
times acting in a "secular" role, and other times in a "religious" role. This
70. See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Faith-based Initiative and the Constitu-
tion, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 5-6 (2001).
[T]he Supreme Court's decisions about aid to religious schools have for many years
cast a shadow on financial relationships between government and religious enter-
prise-in particular, houses of worship and schools with a strongly religious character.
As a result, federal regulations for many years had systematically excluded such enti-
ties from federally financed grants and contracts. Id.
71. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 69 at 2, 12-13.
72. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 70 at 13-14 (observing the difficulties inherent in
tracking the net effects of faith-based programs).
73. See, e.g., GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 69, at 22. For exam-
ple, "since the beginning of the initiative, agencies have awarded over $500 million through
new competitive grant programs to provide training and technical assistance to faith-based
and community organizations and to increase the participation of these organizations in
providing federally funded social services." Id.
74. See generally Carl H. Esbeck, Government Regulation of Religiously Based Social
Services: The First Amendment Considerations, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 343, 365 (1992)
(surveying regulatory burdens placed on recipients of federal funds). Under the faith-
based programs, faith-based organizations cannot "discriminate on the basis of religion or
religious belief in providing services to clients." GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
supra note 70, at 13.
75. Esbeck, supra note 74, at 366; Daniel J. Rosenthal, Charitable Choice Programs
and Title VIl's Co-Religionist Exemption, 39 CREIGHTON L. REV. 641, 664 (2006) (address-
ing "significant questions regarding the participating [faith-based organizations'] discrimi-
natory employment practices").
[Vol. 9:409
MARITAL JAM SESSIONS ON TRIAL
increasing trend of mixed roles emphasizes the need for a clearly defined
ecclesiastical abstention doctrine.
IV. WESTBROOK'S MISSING LINK: EMPLOYMENT DIVISION,
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES V. SMITH
The result I argue for in Westbrook-that courts need not always ab-
stain from deciding whether Westbrook's act of religious discipline consti-
tute torts-raises powerful concerns. Some of these are raised in the
Westbrook briefs:
Adjudication of such a claim against Pastor Westbrook is asking a
civil court to punish Pastor Westbrook for following the basic church
disciplinary process that includes disassociating the congregation
from the unrepentant sins of a church member or former church
member that resigned instead of repenting of those sins. Such pun-
ishment is not only prohibited by the religion clauses of the First
Amendment, it serves to chill other pastors from engaging in church
discipline or discussing sin in an open and honest manner within the
church. In short, adjudication of this case will effectively destroy
church discipline in Texas.76
Or will it? In addition to the questions concerning ecclesiastical ab-
stention, Westbrook presents another unique issue in First Amendment
jurisprudence: should Westbrook's church disciplinary actions and Texas'
professional counselor regulations be subject to scrutiny under Employ-
ment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith?7 7
Smith's central holding is that "the First Amendment's Free Exercise
Clause does not inhibit enforcement of otherwise valid laws of general
application that incidentally burden religious conduct."7 Previous cases
had invalidated state laws on the basis that "governmental actions that
substantially burden a religious practice must be justified by a compelling
governmental interest."79 However, the Court confined those cases to
the discreet setting of unemployment benefits and made Smith's less strict
76. Brief for Petitioner on the Merits at 12, Westbrook v. Penley, No. 04-0838 (Tex.
June 18, 2005) (emphasis added).
77. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
78. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 714 (2005); see also The Supreme Court, 1989
Term - Leading Cases, 104 HARV. L. REV. 40, 198-209 (1990) (contrasting Smith with the
First Amendment protections under Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)). Smith's spe-
cific holding was that "[b]ecause [the] ingestion of peyote was prohibited under Oregon
law, and because that prohibition is constitutional, Oregon may, consistent with the Free
Exercise Clause, deny respondents unemployment compensation when their dismissal re-
sults from use of the drug." Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
79. Smith, 494 U.S. at 883 (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-03 (1963)).
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framework the general governing standard.8" Smith's venture into new
modes of First Amendment jurisprudence continues to be hotly
debated."'
Despite the apparent broad reach of Smith, courts have excepted clergy
cases from Smith's general framework. For example, several courts have
created a ministerial exception that bars ministers' Title V118 claims of
employment discrimination against church employers.83 These courts
often argue that, while Smith addressed "restrictions on an individual's
actions that are based on religious beliefs," Smith did not address "en-
croachments on the ability of a church to manage its internal affairs."84
The argument refers to the ecclesiastical abstention cases and contends
that Smith, "which concerned individual free exercise, did not purport to
overturn a century of precedent protecting the church against govern-
mental interference in selecting its ministers."85
80. Id. at 882-90 (reserving judgment on a class of "hybrid" cases that present "the
Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections").
81. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 514-15 (1997) (tracking Congres-
sional disagreement with Smith); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and
the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109,1111 (1990) ("The Smith decision is undoubt-
edly the most important development in the law of religious freedom in decades .... Free
exercise is no longer wanting for controversy.").
82. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (2000). "[A]lthough Section 702 exempts religious organiza-
tions from Title ViI's coverage for religious discrimination, it does not provide a blanket
exemption for all discrimination. Title VII still prohibits a religious organization from dis-
criminating on the basis of race, color, sex, or national origin." Combs v. Central Tex.
Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343, 346 (5th Cir. 1999)
(citing McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 554-57 (1972)).
83. Werft v. Desert Sw. Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 377 F.3d
1099 (9th Cir. 2004) (barring a minister's disability discrimination suit against the church
employer); Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop, 320 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2003) (barring a
religious communications manager's national origin and gender discrimination suit against
the church employer); Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, 203 F.3d 1299
(11th Cir. 2000) (barring a minister's retaliatory conduct suit against the church employer);
Combs, 173 F.3d at 346 (barring a reverend's sex and pregnancy discrimination suit against
the church employer); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (bar-
ring a nun's sex discrimination and retaliatory conduct suit against the church employer);
Young v. N. Ill. Conference of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184 (7th Cir. 1994) (bar-
ring a minister's race discrimination, sex discrimination, and retaliatory conduct suit
against the church employer); Lewis v. Seventh Day Adventists Lake Region Conference,
978 F.2d 940 (6th Cir. 1992) (barring a minister's retaliatory conduct suit against the
church employer); Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hospitals, 929 F.2d 360
(8th Cir. 1991) (barring a chaplain's age and sex discrimination suit against the church
employer); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (1972) (developing the ministerial
exception to Title VII claims).
84. Combs, 173 F.3d at 349 (emphasis added); accord Gellington, 203 F.3d at 1303-04;
Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d at 461-63.
85. Combs, 173 F.3d at 349.
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To date, the Westbrook litigation has largely ignored the question of
whether Smith governs the Texas professional counseling regulations and
Westbrook's disciplinary actions.86 Nonetheless, while the Title VII min-
isterial exception cases certainly deserve some attention, several unique
aspects of Westbrook warrant a new analysis. The ministerial exception
cases generally rely on two contentions to justify a departure from Smith,
yet neither applies to clergy tort cases such as Westbrook.
First, the ministerial exception cases distinguish burdens on individual
action from burdens on church decisions, holding that Smith governs only
the former.87 However, Penley does not challenge the propriety of a
church decision like the employment decisions in the Title VII cases.88
Instead, Penley challenges Westbrook's action of disclosing her confiden-
tial information to the CCBC elders, and to the CCBC congregation. 89
This distinction between individual actions and church decisions would
produce an odd result in Westbrook. While the First Amendment would
shield the church's decision to direct Westbrook to shun Penley, the First
Amendment would not shield Westbrook's individual act of executing the
church's direction.9° As that result suggests, the ministerial exception
cases are troubling because they fail to recognize that the ability of the
church organization to make religious choices would mean very little if
Smith's language is clearly directed at the first strand of free exercise law, where an
individual contends that, because of his religious beliefs, he should not be required to
conform with generally applicable laws. The concerns raised in Smith are quite differ-
ent from the concerns raised by [this] case, which pertains to interference in internal
church government.
Id.; accord Gellington, 203 F.3d at 1303-04; Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d at 461-63;
Young, 21 F.3d at 185-88; Scharon, 929 F.2d at 363.
86. Penley, 146 S.W.3d 220. Initially, neither the trial court nor the intermediate ap-
pellate court addressed the issue. While Penley raised the issue briefly in her initial filing,
Penley omitted the argument in her merits brief. Compare Response to Petition for Re-
view at 13-14, Westbrook v. Penley, No. 04-0838 (Tex. June 18, 2005), with Brief for Re-
spondent on the Merits, Westbrook v. Penley, No. 04-0838 (Tex. July 11, 2005). Westbrook
spends a small part of his brief arguing that Smith simply "has no application here," and
cites directly to the Title VII ministerial exception cases. Brief for Respondent on the
Merits at 23-24, Westbrook v. Penley, No. 04-0838 (Tex. Mar. 3, 2005). Only at oral argu-
ment did the Court begin to address the issue, albeit sparingly. Oral Argument Audio
Recording, Westbrook v. Penley, No. 04-0838 (Tex. Sept. 26, 2006), available at http://
www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/oralarguments/2004/04-0838.mp3.
87. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d at 462.
88. See supra note 83. Indeed, Penley would appear to have no viable claim if the
church had simply announced to the world that Penley had violated the disciplinary code
of the church without more.
89. Penley, 146 S.W. 3d at 225.
90. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d at 462 (protecting "the freedom of the church to
select those who will carry out its religious mission," but excluding "the freedom of an
individual to observe a particular command or practice of his church").
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the law could prohibit the church's individual religious actors from exe-
cuting those decisions. That is, for First Amendment shields to have any
meaningful effect, the protections must apply to both collective religious
choices and religious acts. In any case, Penley's claim escapes this at-
tempt at compartmentalizing burdens because Penley challenges West-
brook's act of executing CCBC's disciplinary policy.9 Thus, the first
rationale for removing cases from Smith's reach-the distinction between
individual action and church decision-does not apply to Westbrook and
the clergy tort cases.
In order to justify a departure from Smith, the ministerial exception
cases rely on a second specific concern-the importance of deciding mat-
ters of internal church government.92 Initially, this rationale is subject to
important criticisms. The partitioning of matters of "internal church gov-
ernment" seems to invite judicial parsing of important religious doctrines,
a consistently disfavored practice. For example, who constitutes the
church government? Only the Pope? Bishops? Priests? Elders? Lay
ministers? Sunday school teachers? Despite our cultural familiarity with
certain church hierarchies, First Amendment jurisprudence should con-
tinue to avoid such dangerous searches for religious truths, even those
characterizing church hierarchies.93 Setting aside these difficulties, West-
brook and the clergy tort cases should not be removed from Smith be-
cause they do not implicate the concern of protecting internal church
governance. Instead of relating to the selection of a church's ministers
and other persons who speak for the church, Westbrook concerns the acts
of the church toward its primary subjects, the parishioners. Therefore,
the second rationale for removing cases from Smith's rule-the impor-
tance of independent internal church governance-does not apply to
Westbrook and the clergy tort cases.
As a result, Westbrook deserves a new analysis under Smith. And
while a full analysis of Smith's application is beyond the scope of this
note, several preliminary observations are notable. First, if Smith's gen-
eral rule applies, at least some of the Court's language suggests that cler-
gymen in Westbrook's position will not be protected by the First
Amendment. For example, parts of Watson mirror Smith's general logic,
recognizing only the "right to entartain [sic] any religious belief, to prac-
tice any religious principle and to teach any religious doctrine which does
not violate the laws of morality and property, and which does not infringe
91. Penley, 146 S.W.3d at 224-25.
92. See, e.g., Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d at 462.
93. See Notes, Judicial Intervention in Disputes over the Use of Church Property, 75
HARV. L. REv. 1142, 1143-44, 1160-64 (1962) (outlining the difficulties inherent in identi-
fying exact church hierarchies).
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personal rights."9 4 Similarly, the circuits acknowledging ministerial ex-
ceptions to Title VII obligations recognize that, "whereas the Free Exer-
cise Clause guarantees a church's freedom to decide how it will govern
itself, what it will teach, and to whom it will entrust its ministerial respon-
sibilities, it does not guarantee the right of its members to practice what
their church may preach if that practice is forbidden by a neutral law of
general application."95 These surface judgments suggest that the First
Amendment may not shield Westbrook from liability under the Texas
statutes governing licensed professional counselors.
However, Smith leaves open the possibility of different treatment for
actions that fall within the holdings of the cases using the Sherbert frame-
work, as well as the hybrid cases implicating multiple constitutional
rights.96 These and other important implications of Smith should be ad-
dressed head-on by The Supreme Court of Texas in Westbrook. Finally,
just like the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, the increase in clergy tort
litigation resulting from faith-based programs will demand clear rules
concerning the reach of Smith.97
V. CONCLUSION
This note argues for two primary results. First, that the Supreme Court
of Texas should not abstain from deciding the merits of Westbrook be-
cause of Westbrook's unique role as religious leader and licensed profes-
sional counselor. Second, that Westbrook deserves careful scrutiny under
the law of Smith. But the note's overarching theme is that courts should
avoid using the doctrine of ecclesiastical abstention as a tool to avoid
constitutional confrontation. Instead, courts should confront these diffi-
cult issues of "intrinsic importance and far-reaching influence,"9 8 for
94. Watson, 80 U.S. at 729 (emphasis added); accord Smith, 494 U.S. at 882 ("Our
cases do not at their farthest reach support the proposition that a stance of conscientious
opposition relieves an objector from any colliding duty fixed by a democratic
government.").
95. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d at 463 (exempting church employment decisions
from Title VII regulations); accord Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc'y of Jesus, 196 F.3d
940 (9th Cir. 1999) ("[T]his sort of generalized and diffuse concern for church autonomy,
without more, does not exempt them from the operation of secular laws. Otherwise,
churches would be free from all of the secular legal obligations that currently and routinely
apply to them.").
96. See Paul J. Morken, Church Discipline and Civil Tort Claims: Should Ecclesiastical
Tribunals Be Immune?, 28 IDAHO L. REV. 93, 156-63 (1991) (analyzing ecclesiastical ab-
stention with reference to the cases excluded from Smith's framework). Morken argues
that "Smith's categorical rule is almost inversely related to the Ecclesiastical Abstention
Doctrine and the holding in Serbian . Id. at 159.
97. See supra Part III C.
98. Watson, 80 U.S. at 734.
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"[b]lessed are they who maintain justice, who constantly do what is
right."99
99. Psalms 106:3 (New American Standard).
